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ABSTRACT
Public-private sectoral wage differentials have been studied extensively
using quantile regression techniques. These typically find large public
sector premiums at the bottom of the wage distribution. This may imply
that low skill workers are ‘overpaid’, prompting concerns over efficiency.
We note several other potential explanations for this result and explicitly
test whether the premium varies with skill, using Australian data. We use a
quasi-differenced GMM panel data model which has not been previously
applied to this topic, internationally. Unlike other available methods, this
technique identifies sectoral differences in returns to unobserved skill. It
also facilitates a decomposition of the wage gap into components
explained by differences in returns to all (observed and unobserved) skills
and by differences in their stock. We find no evidence to suggest that the
premium varies with skill. One interpretation is that the compressed wage
profile of the public sector induces the best workers (on unobserved skills)
to join the public sector in low wage occupations, vice versa in high
wage occupations. We also estimate the average public sector premium
to be 6% for women and statistically insignificant (4%) for men.
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I

INTRODUCTION

In developed countries, the distributions of wages in the public sector are typically
more condensed than in the private sector (see for example the review of
Gregory and Borland 1999; and cross-national evidence from Lucifora and Muers
2006). Studies using quantile regressions and quantile regression decompositions
find that this is not fully explained by the mix of ‘skill’ (proxied by education and
years of experience) in the two sectors (Birch 2006; Blackaby et al. 1998; Cai and
Liu 2011; Gregory and Borland 1999; Lucifora and Muers 2006; Melly 2005; Mueller
1998). A typical finding across countries and sexes is that public sector workers at
the bottom of the wage distribution receive a large pay premium (holding
education and experience constant), whilst public sector workers near the top of
the wage distribution receive a wage penalty, or a small premium. Such results
motivate concerns that low-skill public sector workers are overpaid, resulting in
public sector inefficiency, whilst high-skill public sector workers are underpaid,
leading to difficulties in retainment (Birch 2006; Lucifora and Muers 2006; Mueller
1998). These concerns assume that the quantile regression findings reflect a public
sector wage premium that varies with skill. In other words, the public sector may
provide lower overall returns to skill (whilst paying a premium that is independent
of skill). But there are other possible explanations for the quantile regression results.
There may be greater variation in private sector wages for each given level of skill
(Bender 2003). It is also possible that in this context, education and experience are
inadequate proxies of skill which bias the results (we expand on this suggestion
below). The source of these results has major implications for assessing public
sector efficiency as well as for interpreting the effect of public sector employment
on the distribution of wages. Are low skill public sector workers overpaid, whilst
high skill public sector workers are underpaid? Our primary aim in this paper is to
examine explicitly whether the public sector wage premium varies with skill.
We feel that insufficient consideration has been given in this literature to the role of
‘unobservables’ in the sorting of workers into sectors. In most studies, experience
and education are the only proxies for skill. To illustrate the possible implication of
this, consider the notion that workers with little experience or education are better
paid in the public sector than in the private sector, vice versa for more educated
and experienced workers. This is implicit in the results of studies which estimate
1

separate wage equations for each sector which find that returns to education
and earnings are lower in the public sector (see the review by Bender 1998; and
recent evidence for Australia in Birch 2006). But economic theory (and common
sense) suggests that less educated and inexperienced workers would hence
prefer to work in the public sector, vice versa for more educated and
experienced workers. If employers (in hiring, firing and promotions) observe better
indicators of skill than are available to econometricians, the standard quantile
regression results may be partially (or completely) explained by bias due to sector
selection. There are many such indicators of skill available to employers, even at
the stage of recruitment. These include the relevance of qualifications (field of
study), the quality of the institution of study, relevance of work experience (firms
and industries worked for), proxies of intelligence and work ethic (school grades),
interpersonal skills (observed during the interview) and so on. Thus it is conceivable
that the lower public sector returns to observables are offset by sector sorting on
unobservables, due to the information that is available to employers (but not
econometricians). This argument concords with the corresponding union wage
effects literature. Reviewing the empirical evidence, Card et al. (2004) argue that
failure to account for unobserved characteristics leads to overstating the extent to
which union wage effect varies with skill (see also Card 1996).
Selectivity corrections would seem to be a potential solution to this problem. These
have been used extensively in the related literature on decomposing the mean
wage premium (Gregory and Borland 1999). They have also been attempted in a
quantile regression context (Melly 2006). However, selectivity corrections have
major limitations in this context. They cannot differentiate between sectoral
differences in the stock of unobserved skills from sectoral differences in returns to
such skills. They do not, therefore, facilitate Oaxaca-type decompositions which
treat observed and unobserved skills symmetrically (Gyourko and Tracy 1988;
Neuman and Oaxaca 2004). Secondly, there appears to be a lack of credible
exclusion restrictions to implement such methods.1 Further, sector selection is a non
1
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2003; Dustmann and van Soest, 1998; Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993; Melly, 2006;
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standard selection problem, since workers select from a set of potential employers
and vice versa (see Card 1996; Farber 1983 in the related context of union status).
Fixed effects quantile regressions have also been developed (Bargain and Melly
2008). But they too do not allow for differences in returns to unobservables.
Here, we address these issues through an alternate approach. We implement an
estimator proposed by Lemieux (1993; 1998), using Australian data. This is a quasidifferenced panel data model, estimated by GMM. To our knowledge, it is the
only available estimator that fully disentangles returns from stocks of all (observed
and unobserved) skills and it has not been applied to this topic before. In our
adaptation, we use a single index of (latent) skill. Our main interest is in whether
returns to this concept of skill vary between sectors. We find no evidence of
differences in returns. This conforms to our expectations of sector sorting on
unobserved characteristics and it informs the interpretation of established quantile
regression results. We also decompose the average wage gap into the
components explained by returns and stocks of (all) skills. We estimate a positive
average public sector premium for women and an insignificant positive premium
for men.
The estimator is discussed in Section Error! Reference source not found.. The data
source is the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel
survey, which is described in Section III. Section IV presents results, including
estimated parameters, a decomposition of the raw average wage gap, sensitivity
tests and comparisons with other estimators. Section V offers conclusions.

Heitmeuller, 2006; Melly, 2006), which are likely to be endogenous to working in a unionised
environment. Some use parent’s education (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993),
which is also likely to be correlated with unobserved skills. Others have used age (Borland
et al., 1998; Kanellopoulos, 1997). But age is correlated with risk aversion (Halek and
Eisenhauer, 2001; Pålsson, 1996), which may be rewarded differently in the two sectors
(Gregory and Borland, 1999).
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II METHODS
The model is adapted from Lemieux (1993, 1998), who used a similar approach to
estimate the effect of unions on wages.2 The intuition of the model is in some
respects similar to that of a first-difference model. The key parameters are
estimated by sector movers and sector choice can be correlated with
(unobserved) characteristics. The main innovation of Lemieux’s approach is that
unlike all other approaches used for this topic, it accounts for differences between
sectors in returns to unobserved characteristics. The method is centred around a
single wage equation of the following form:

ln wit = δ tR + Pit δ + X it [ β R + Pit ( β P − β R )] + [1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]θ i + ε it

(1)

The wage observed for employee i at time t is a function of sector (P = 1 if the
employee is in the public sector and zero otherwise), job characteristics (X), a
single (latent) index of skill (θ) and an idiosyncratic error. The coefficient δ
represents a constant public sector premium, independent of skill. Returns to skills
are allowed to differ between sectors through ψ . If ψ = 1, returns to skills are equal
across sectors. If ψ < 1, returns to skills are systematically lower in the public sector
that the private sector, which would imply that any public sector wage premium is
smaller for high skill workers than for low skill workers, vice versa if ψ > 1. Our main
interest is thus to test whether ψ = 1. The only job characteristics (X) of interest are
those which attract compensation for working conditions (such as shift work, or an
absence of job security or leave entitlements). Returns to such job characteristics
(β ) are also allowed to differ by sector, with the superscripts P and R denoting
returns in the public and private sectors, respectively.

A

Decomposition of the Raw Sectoral Wage Gap

If estimable, the parameters in (1) can be used in a decomposition of the raw
average wage gap, which distinguishes between the effects of differences in the
stock of skills and job characteristics as well as the effects of differences in returns
to both skills and job characteristics. Consider the mean wage difference
between sectors:

2
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models.
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ln( wP ) − ln( wR ) = (δ tP + β P X P + ψθ P ) − (δ tR + β R X R + θ R )
= δ + β P X P − β R X R + ψθ P − θ R
= [δ + X P ( β P − β R ) + (ψ − 1)θ R ] + [( X P − X R ) β R + (θ P − θ R )]

(2)

The contents of the first square brackets represent the effects of differences in
wage setting policies, which includes a constant difference ( δ ) and differences in
returns to characteristics. The second term represents the effects of differences in
characteristics.

B

Estimation3

The first step to estimate (1) is to ‘quasi-difference’ the wage equation. That is, to
substitute θ for the expression obtained when θ is made the subject of the
argument in a first lag as follows:

θ i = [ln wit −1 − (δ tR−1 + Pit −1δ + X it −1[ β R + Pit −1 ( β P − β R )] + ε it −1 ] /[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

(3)

Substituting into (1):

ln wit = Ft ( X it , Pit ) +

[1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
× [ln wit −1 − Ft −1 ( X it −1 , Pit −1 )] + eit
[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

(4)

where:

eit = ε it −

[1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
ε it −1
[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

and

Ft ( X it , Pit ) = δ tR + Pit δ + X it [ β R + Pit ( β P − β R )]
Equation (4) is nonlinear and includes an endogenous regressor: ln wit −1 , which is
correlated with ε it −1 and hence with eit . It would seem natural for ln wit −1 to be
instrumented by ln wit − 2 , which is available for this study. However, the likely serial
correlation between ε it − 2 and ε it −1 renders ln wit − 2 an invalid instrument. This is

3
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because the sample (described in Section III) is restricted to job changers
between t-1 and t, most of whom did not also change jobs between t-2 and t-1.
Given that ε’ will include a job-specific component, the correlation between ε it − 2
and ε it −1 will be greater than between ε it −1 and ε it . As such, ln wit − 2 will also be
correlated with eit .
An alternative instrument is the interaction of the lagged and unlagged sector
indicators: Pit Pit −1 . The complete sector history indicators described by Lemieux
(1998) are equivalent to the three sector variables: Pit , Pit −1 and Pit Pit −1 . The validity
of Pit Pit −1 as an instrument follows from the assumed exogeneity of Pit and Pit −1 . The
relevance of Pit Pit −1 as an instrument for ln wit −1 results from the correlation
between Pit Pit −1 and θ i . In other words, Pit Pit −1 is a relevant instrument if the
average skill of public sector joiners is different to the average skill of public sector
leavers (see Lemieux 1993: Appendix 1 for further discussion of these issues). Since

θ i is not observed, this is difficult to test.4 However, an approximate alternative is to
test whether the average wage of joiners is different to that of leavers (averaged
across their public and private sector observations). The three sector variables are
also interacted with X it −1 and X it to create further instruments.
Equation (4) can be estimated efficiently by GMM. The GMM estimator minimises
the following objective function:

e(α )′ZWZ ′e(α )
where the weighting matrix W is the inverse of the estimated variance matrix of the
moment functions, estimated by NLIV (see Davidson and MacKinnon 1993;
Greene 2003; Hansen 1982).
In order to separately identify δ tR , δ tR−1 and δ , it is necessary to impose a further
restriction on the parameters. The mean value of θ across all people and both
years is constrained to be zero:
4

In linear IV, instrument relevance can be determined by testing the significance of the

instrument(s) in the first stage regression. This is not the case for nonlinear GMM (see Stock
et al., 2002).
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 1 
∑ (θˆit + θˆit −1 ) = 0
 2N  i

θ =

(5)

where N is the number of people and

θˆis = {ln wis − (δ sR + Pisδ + X is [ β R + Pis ( β P − β R )]} /[1 + Pis (ψ − 1)] for s ∈ (t , t − 1) (6)
This restriction involves the sum of a nonlinear function across the entire sample.
However, it can be easily imposed by noting that the denominator of this
expression can only take two values: 1 and ψ.

C

Identification

The estimates of δ and ψ are identified only by movers between sectors. This can
be seen by noting that both disappear from (4) when Pit = Pit −1 . Thus reasonable
estimates of δ and ψ can only be obtained with a data set that has a sufficiently
large number of movers.
Similarly, the coefficients of X in each sector (βP and βR) are only independently
identified by people whose X changes between t-1 and t. In the present
application, only job characteristics are included in X. In principle, observed time
varying human capital variables could also be included in X. Consider the
standard

human

capital

variables:

experience

and

education.

Sectoral

differences in returns to education could be identified by individuals (in each
sector) whose educational attainment changed between observations. In the
case of experience, the main issue for identification is the ability to distinguish it’s
effect from that of pure wage inflation or other changes between observations
that affect all workers (as measured by δ tR − δ tR−1 ). The returns to experience could
thus be identified by the set of people whose experience increased by less than
the time elapsed between observations.
An alternate identification strategy is used in this paper. Education can be treated
as time invariant if people whose highest educational qualification changed
between t-1 and t (of whom there are very few as shown in the following section)
are excluded from the analysis. Education can thus be incorporated as a
component of θ, and differences in returns to education can be incorporated in

ψ. This highlights a key difference between this model and standard panel data
1

models. In a FE model, leaving education in θ implies an assumption of no sectoral
differences in returns to education. This is not the case here. Thus differences in
time invariant skills (including education) are identified by movers between
sectors. One advantage of this identification strategy is that it does not require
any education changers. By leaving education in θ, the approach also avoids
several other problems characteristic of the standard panel data approach.
These include the assumptions that returns to education are immediate rather
than lagged and that returns to education for students who simultaneously work
are representative of all employees. It also avoids ambiguity over whether the
highest level of educational qualification is the appropriate human capital
measure, or whether the total quantity of education (in years) is more
appropriate. A consequence of this strategy is that sectoral differences in returns
to education are not separately identified from differences in returns to other time
invariant skills.
A similar strategy is available to incorporate the effects of experience. Since the
two observations are only one year apart, experience is almost completely time
invariant and can thus be incorporated into θ , similarly to the treatment of
education. The effect of the last one year increase in experience is incorporated
into δ tR − δ tR−1 .5

5

It is acknowledged that the effect of a one year increase in experience may differ across

the experience distribution, as reflected by the standard practice of including experience
in quadratic form in wage equations (Mincer, 1974; Preston, 1997). It would be possible to
include experience in quadratic form in the wage equation here. This is not pursued for a
number of reasons. First, such an inclusion would make the interpretation of ψ more
difficult. In the preferred model, ψ facilitates a simple assessment of whether differences in
returns to skills differ between sectors. Second, the nonlinearity in returns to experience
would only be identified through an increase in one year of experience for each
employee. To reiterate the nature of this restriction, it assumes that returns to the last single
year of experience do not vary across experience levels. However, there is no restriction to
the functional form of returns to all previous years of experience. This restriction is thus
unlikely to be of any substantive consequence.
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D

Exogenous Switching Assumption

The model relies on the assumption that sector choice is uncorrelated with e,
conditional on X and θ. It allows sector selection to be correlated with θ. But it
does not allow for the possibility that workers switch sectors due to changes in
person

and

sector

specific

productivity

(i.e.

time-varying

comparative

advantage). Lemieux argues that this problem is reduced by considering only
involuntary job changers. These were people who changed jobs due to ‘plant
closing, family responsibilities, illness, geographic moves, dismissal, or other forms of
layoffs’. This is problematic. Workers may be dismissed or laid off precisely due to a
fall in sector-specific productivity (especially if institutional constraints prevent a
wage reduction). Even if an involuntary job loss is assumed exogenous, there is no
reason to believe that subsequent sector choice is unaffected by time-varying
comparative advantage. Thus we do not follow Lemieux’s approach of limiting
the sample to the set of involuntary job changers. In any case, the number of job
changers who report changing jobs involuntarily is too small in HILDA to adopt this
approach, as it would reduce the sample size by approximately 75%.
Instead, we provide empirical support (in the next section) for the exogenous
switching assumption. The rationale is based on the following arguments. If timevarying comparative advantage were an important factor in sector switching,
one would expect to find an apparent public sector premium for public sector
joiners and a corresponding private sector premium for public sector leavers. In
other words, switching sectors would be associated with an increased wage,
regardless of the direction of the switch. With purely exogenous switching, one
would expect to see a public sector premium (or penalty) that does not depend
on the direction of the switch (public to private or private to public). This is indeed
what we find in the data. Next, even if time-varying comparative advantage
were an important factor in sector switches, it would only bias the key results in
specific circumstances. The mean public sector premium would be biased up
(down) only to the extent that the number of public sector joiners (leavers) in the
sample dominate the number of leavers (joiners). A similar argument holds for ψ.
Time-varying comparative advantage would lead to downward bias in ψ only to
the extent that public sector leavers are concentrated at the top of the skill
distribution (relative to joiners), vice versa for an upward bias. Whilst the distribution
of θ is not attainable, the wage distribution of leavers and joiners (averaged
1

across their public and private sector observations) is arguably a close substitute in
the present context. We will show that this distribution is similar for leavers and
joiners.

E

Factors Not Included in the Model

Some factors that may affect sectoral wage differences have not been
incorporated in the model and need to be taken into account when interpreting
the results. In particular, earnings are an incomplete measure of the total return to
labour. Employees may be willing to accept lower earnings in exchange for other
benefits. Superannuation and paid maternity leave entitlements may be
important considerations and both are more generous in the public sector.
Employer contributions to superannuation are a major component of total
remuneration. Under the Superannuation Guarantee, employers have been
required to contribute to each employee’s superannuation at a rate equal to at
least 9% of earnings since 2002. Historically, superannuation in the public sector
has been generous. The Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme commenced in
1922, providing some public sector retirees with a defined benefit pension equal
to up to 70% of their final salary, indexed to inflation (Department of Finance and
Administration 2001). Subsequent reforms have resulted in less generous pensions.
If superannuation schemes remain more generous in the public sector, this may
have a downward effect on public sector earnings through a compensating
wage differential. However, sectoral comparisons of employer contributions are
hampered by differences in the benefit structures of superannuation schemes.
Schemes fall into three main structures: accumulation, defined benefits and a
hybrid of the two. In accumulation funds, employers contribute superannuation
continuously, in proportion to earnings. In defined benefit funds, the value of
employer contributions is unknown at the time that wages are earned because
the benefits are often defined in relation to employees’ final salary. For this reason,
the major recent survey of superannuation in Australia, the Survey of Employment
Arrangements and Superannuation (SEAS), only provides a measure of employer
contributions for those who have active accumulation funds (and no defined
benefit or hybrid accounts) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001). This excludes 63%
of public sector employee respondents and 15% of those in the private sector. For
the remaining sample, average employer contributions are similar in the two
1

sectors (6.6% in the public sector and 6.8% in the private sector).6 This is unlikely to
be a good indication of the overall generosity of employer contributions in the
public sector. It does suggest, however, that few private sector employees receive
more than the minimum legislated contribution from their employer.
Paid maternity leave was not mandatory In Australia until January 2011 (after the
period of data coverage used here). In the pre-2011 era at least, public sector
employers were much more likely to provide paid maternity leave than private
sector employers. In 2005, the Australian Bureau of Statistics surveyed women who
had a child under two years of age. Of those who were public sector employees
whilst pregnant, 76% accessed paid maternity leave, compared to 27% in the
private sector (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007: 135). HILDA includes data on
paid maternity leave entitlement. But it is poorly reported, with missing values
recorded for approximately 40% of females in the sample used here, most of
whom did not know whether they were entitled. Paid maternity leave may have a
downward effect on public sector wages for females to the extent that they are
willing to sacrifice some earnings in order to access this benefit. See Edwards
(2006) for recent evidence of a compensating wage differential associated with
paid maternity leave in Australia.
There may also be sectoral differences in job security and flexibility and
differences in the utility derived from the work itself. Such factors would induce
compensating wage differentials in less attractive jobs. These are only partly
measured by the casual status variable (which will capture some of the effects of
job instability) and the shiftwork variable (which will capture the compensation
paid for the disutility of shift work), as discussed in the following section. No controls
are included for industry and occupation. This implies an assumption that the
6

Author’s calculations from the SEAS Expanded Confidentialised Unit Record File. The

percentage contribution was calculated by the author for each employee as total
employer contributions divided by usual weekly income from main job. The sample was
restricted to employees, excluding employees of own business. People with more than one
job were excluded as the employer contribution variable does not differentiate between
jobs. At the time of the survey, the minimum legislated employer contribution was 8%.
Employees with monthly income below $450 per month are exempt, as are those under 18
years of age working less than 30 hours per week. Thus it is reasonable for the average
contribution to be less than 8%.
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industries and occupations of jobs in one sector are not generally less appealing
compared to the other sector, in the sense that they detract from utility directly.
Some supporting evidence for this assumption is presented in the following
sections. It is shown in Section IV that the inclusion of industry and occupation
controls in related models makes almost no difference to the estimates. Further,
there is no evidence of sectoral differences in work stress and work satisfaction in
Australia, as discussed in Section V. At a practical level, the samples in the
preferred models are too small to accurately identify compensating differentials
off movers between industries and occupations.
We do not control for size of employer or union status. The public sector is a highly
unionised workforce characterised by large employers. Both of these factors are
associated with higher hourly earnings (Miller and Mulvey 1996; Wooden 2001). We
treat these as inherent features of the public sector which we do not abstract
from. Wooden (2001) has shown that in the Australian labour market,
characterised by enterprise bargaining, the effect of unions on wages operates at
the level of the workplace rather than the individual. Thus workers in highly
unionised workplaces enjoy a wage premium, regardless of their personal union
membership. Since HILDA does not include such data on the workplace, any
attempt to explicitly account for the effect of unionisation is likely to be
misleading.

III DATA
The data used for this study are from the Household, Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. HILDA is a nationally representative
household-based panel survey, with annual observations taken since 2001, with an
initial sample of 7682 households and 19,914 individuals. The analysis utilises all
eight available waves (2001-2008).
The estimation sample is defined as the set of employees who changed
employers between any two consecutive observations (e.g. between Waves 1 &
2; or between Waves 2 & 3; and so on).7 The restriction to job changers is because

7

Employees employed by their own business at either observation were excluded.

1

sector of employment is self reported and thus may be measured with error.8 Since
only a small proportion of employees change sectors between consecutive years,
a large proportion of apparent sector movers may be incorrectly identified due to
reporting error. Indeed, preliminary analysis revealed that more than half of
apparent sector movers did not report a change in employer in the same period,
suggesting that a large proportion of movers may be misclassified.9 To address this
issue, the sample is limited to those who reported a change in employer, which
follows Lemieux’s (1998) approach.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings. Hourly earnings
are derived as ‘current weekly gross wage and salary in main job’ divided by
‘hours per week usually worked in main job’. Wage inflation is accounted for by
scaling observed wages in each year by gender-specific full time ordinary time
average weekly earnings to 2008 levels.
The only observed characteristics included in the model (X) are dummy variables
for shift or irregular work and for ‘casual’ employment contracts. The shift work
variable captures any compensating wage differentials resulting from the disutility
of shift work.10 The casual status variable is included because the wages of
‘casual’ employees usually include a loading that compensates for a lack of
entitlements received under other contracts. The size of such loadings, however,
varies considerably, depending on the Award or enterprise agreement under
which an employee is covered. Watson (2005) notes a variation of 15% to 33.3%
amongst enterprise bargaining agreement in the ACIRRT ADAM database

Public sector employees are those who identified their employer as a ‘Government

8

business

enterprise

or

commercial

statutory

authority’

or

‘Other

governmental

organisation’.
9

There are, however, a number of other possible explanations. It may result from reporting

errors in the change in employer variable, since this relies on retrospective recall. It is also
possible for employees to change sector without changing employer. This is the case
when a public corporation is privatised. In any case, the conservative approach is taken
here, by limiting the sample to employees who reported a change in employer.
10

Current work schedule is self-reported. Shift work is defined as any schedule other than a

‘regular daytime schedule’. Most employees classified as shift workers reported ‘A rotating
shift (changes from days to evenings to nights)’; an ‘Irregular schedule’; or a ‘Regular
Evening Schedule’.
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between 1994-2002. The loading is also between 15% and 33% in most Awards, but
is sometimes less than this and can be as high as 50% (Owens 2001). Furthermore,
many self-identified casuals do not receive any loading at all (Wooden and
Warren 2003). A manual adjustment to the wages of casual workers is considered
infeasible, since it is unclear how large such an adjustment would need to be. Thus
the size of the loading is estimated by the model. Secondly, it is possible that
average casual loadings are different between the two sectors. In the main set of
estimates, however, the loading is constrained to be equal, because no
significant difference is found between sectors when the parameter is allowed to
vary. The results are not sensitive to this restriction as will be shown.
Separate models are estimated for men and for women. Exclusions from the sample are detailed
in

1

Table 1. Observations were excluded due to missing data at either observation
(missing wage, sector, highest educational qualification, casual or shift status).
Observations were also excluded where the real wage was recorded to have
changed by more than one log point between observations (i.e. by a factor of
more than 2.72). A small number of people whose highest educational
qualification changed between observations were excluded to ensure that
education is time invariant, as discussed in the previous section. The estimation
sample consists of 2703 men and 2520 women.
The sector movers consist of 294 men and 461 women. These observations identify

δ and ψ. Casual status changed between observations for 741 men and 767
women. These records identify the estimated casual loading. Shift work status
changed between observations for 628 men and 663 women. These records
identify the estimated compensation for shift work.
Table 2 shows weighted means for the main sample by sex and sector. It also
facilitates comparisons of the characteristics of sector movers to that of the full
sample. This table shows that the raw public-private difference in mean log wages
is 0.14 for men and 0.23 for women. Public sector employees are much more likely
to hold a degree or higher qualification and to work in professional occupations.
Amongst females, public sector employees also have more experience, less so for
men. Private sector employees are more likely to be employed in casual jobs and
to work in shift work arrangements. It is also clear that sector movers are similar to
the rest of the sample, with their mean characteristics lying between the public
and private means on most measures. Approximately half of male job changers
also changed occupation, regardless of sector. This proportion is slightly higher for
male sector movers (57%). Amongst females, the proportion of sector changers
who changed occupation was similar to that of job changers overall.
Table 3 facilitates an evaluation of the extent to which sector movers resemble
the set of all employees (not just job changers). It is based on Table 2, with the
sample expanded to the set of all employees. The mean characteristics of sector
movers are similar to that of all employees in most regards. The main differences
are that sector movers are less experienced (especially amongst males) and had
worked for their employer for a shorter period (at t-1). Amongst males, they are
also less likely to be ‘Managers’.
17

The wage distribution of sector movers is compared to that of other groups in
Figure

1

18

and

Figure 2. Figure 1 shows that the wage distribution of sector movers is very similar to
that

of

all

job

changers,

especially
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those

in

the

public

sector.

Figure 2 shows that the wage distribution of sector movers is not strikingly different
to that of all employees in each sector either, perhaps resembling the private
sector distribution slightly more than the public sector distribution.
A slightly higher proportion of sector movers moved into the public sector rather
than away from the public sector (60% of male sector movers and 57% of female
sector movers). This is not surprising given that public sector workers are more
experienced on average. There were no major changes in this proportion across
the years included in the sample.
It was suggested in Section Error! Reference source not found. that an
approximate test of instrument relevance is to test whether the mean wage of
public sector leavers is different to that of joiners. The results of such tests are
shown

in
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Table 4, which shows the mean ln wage for public sector joiners and leavers,
across both observations, so that both the public and private sector wage is
included in the calculation for each employee. There is clear evidence that public
sector leavers have a higher wage than public sector jointers amongst both males
and females (a difference of 0.103 for males and 0.070 for females). These
differences are statistically significant (p = 0.030 for males; p = 0.012 for females)
which provides evidence for instrument relevance (see section II.B). If the male
and female samples are pooled, the evidence is stronger still (p = 0.002). For this
reason, the model is re-estimated for a pooled sample of males and females as a
robustness test. It will be shown that the three sets of results, that for men, women
and overall are similar and that the key estimates for the pooled model lie in
between that of the male and female models.
The middle panel of Table 4 shows mean log wage changes leavers, joiners and
job changers who did not change sector. Relative to job changers who did not
change sector, the log wage of public sector joiners increased by a mean of
0.041. The corresponding change for leavers is a decrease of 0.054. Thus
endogenous sector switching does not appear to have empirical support in this
application. Table 4 also shows the numbers of leavers and joiners in the sample,
which are fairly similar.
Figure 3 shows the wage distributions for leavers and joiners (averaged across their
public and private sector observations). These are similar, strongly suggesting that
leavers and joiners are similarly distributed across the skill distribution. The
corresponding distributions by sex (not shown) are noisier, but lead to the same
qualitative conclusion.

IV RESULTS
A

Parameter Estimates

The results of the GMM estimation are shown in Table 5. There is no evidence of
sectoral differences in returns to skills. A value of ψ that is less than 1 suggests that
returns to skills are smaller in the public sector than the private sector. For males, ψ
is estimated to be 0.954, while for females it is 1.118. In the pooled model it is 0.960.
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This parameter is not significantly different from 1 in any model. Thus there is no
evidence to suggest that the size of the public sector wage premium depends on
the level of skill. This important result is considered in more detail in Section V.
The constant effect ( δ ) of public sector employment on wages is estimated to be
positive and small (0.044 for men and 0.042 for women). This parameter is
statistically significant for men (p = 0.038), and borders on significance for women
(p = 0.073). The estimate is slightly higher in the pooled model across sexes (0.052)
and is highly significant.
Positive and statistically significant loadings for casual status are estimated for
both sexes and in the pooled model. Compensation for shift work is not statistically
significant. The coefficients of casual and shift were constrained to be equal
across sectors in the results reported in, since Wald tests do not reject the
hypothesis of equality across sectors for either parameter in any model. The results
are not sensitive to these restrictions, as will be shown.
The Hansen statistic, reported at the bottom of Table 5, facilitates partial tests of
instrument validity in overidentified GMM models. It is equal to the minimised value
of the objective function multiplied by the sample size. Under the null hypothesis
the statistic follows a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of overidentifying restrictions, which is the difference between the number of
instruments and the number of parameters (Hansen 1982). In the models
estimated here, there are 14 overidentifying restrictions. In the male and pooled
models the p-values greatly exceed 0.05 and so the null hypothesis is not rejected.
In the female model the p-value is slightly less than the critical value (0.044).
However this may simply result from parameter heterogeneity in the population,
with the different instruments picking up various local averages.

B

Decomposition of the Raw Wage Gap

The decomposition results are shown in Table 6. The main result is that the average
public sector wage premium is estimated to be positive but small for men (0.040),
slightly larger for women (0.059), with the estimate from the pooled model lying
between the two (0.048). Statistically, this estimate is significantly different from
zero for women (p<0.001) and the pooled model (p<0.001), but not for men
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(p=0.072).11 The 95% confidence intervals are (-0.004, 0.083) for men, (0.029, 0.089)
for women and (0.022, 0.073) overall. These imply an average public sector wage
premium of e0.040 – 1 = 4.1% for men, e0.059 – 1 = 6.1% for women and e0.048 – 1 =
4.9% overall.
Returning to Table 6, the majority of the raw wage gap is explained by differences
in characteristics. In particular, the largest component of the wage gap is
accounted for by sectoral differences in the stock of time invariant skills (which
include education, experience and unobserved characteristics). In each model,
this is a positive effect, suggesting that the average public sector employee is
more skilled than their private sector counterpart. This is consistent with Table 2,
which shows that they are more educated and more experienced. Differences in
casual and shiftwork status are not major factors.

C

Robustness Tests

This subsection considers the robustness of the results with respect to a number of
modifications to the preferred model. As discussed by Stock et al. (2002: 527),
sensitivity to minor methodological changes is suggestive of weak identification in
nonlinear GMM models. The estimates of primary interest are δ (the constant
effect of public sector employment on wages), ψ (returns to skills in the public
sector relative the private sector), and the total average effect of public sector
employment on wages. These are shown for a range of alternate specifications in
Table 7.
The first set of results are for a model where returns to ‘casual’ and ‘shift’ are not
constrained to be equal in the two sectors. These estimates are similar to that of
the preferred model, though they are slightly less precise, reflecting the increase in
the number of parameters estimated by the model. The constant effect δ
becomes statistically insignificant. As shown in the next two sets of results, if the
11

The results of the decomposition are a function of the estimated coefficients and the

sample means. The standard errors of the decomposition take account of the variancecovariance matrix of the estimated parameter vector. They also take account of the
standard errors on the sample means. They also account for the fact that the estimated
mean time invariant characteristics of workers in each sector ( θ P and
the estimated parameters and the sample means.
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θ R ) are functions of

models are estimated by NLIV or iterated GMM, the results are very similar to the
preferred model. When sample weights are applied, the estimates also remain
similar to the preferred model.
In the next seven sets of results, the sample is restricted to job changers between
any single pair of consecutive waves (e.g. between Waves 1 & 2 only). Thus the
sample size is severely restricted to approximately one seventh of the main
models. Consequently, the estimates vary between these models. It is clear,
however, that the changes to the estimates are always within reasonable realms
of sampling error (the majority of point estimates are within one standard error of
those in the preferred model, almost all are within two standard errors, and all are
within three standard errors). This constitutes strong support for the validity of
inference for the main set of estimates. Thus the results are generally robust to the
methodological modifications considered.
The final set of results in Table 7 was generated by estimating the quasidifferenced wage equation (equation 7) by nonlinear least squares, thereby
ignoring the endogeneity of ln wit −1 . The standard errors on these estimates are
smaller than in the preferred model (especially for ψ), but they are qualitatively
similar. Like in the preferred model, the estimates of δ are small positives for both
sexes and the estimates of ψ are not significantly different from 1. The average
wage premiums are also positive, statistically significant and similar to the
preferred model.

D

Comparison with other Methods

The estimated average public sector wage premiums are compared in
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Table 8 to corresponding estimates generated through other methods.
The OLS and Oaxaca decomposition models are estimated using observations for employees
across all six waves of HILDA.12 Observations are excluded if the real recorded wage was less
that $5 per hour or more than $100 per hour. Control variables include experience, experience
squared, highest educational qualification (6 dummy variables), casual status, shift work status,
years with current employer, years in current occupation, occupation (46 dummy variables for
men; 43 for women), proficiency in English (3 dummy variables), married, state or territory (7
dummy variables) and remoteness (3 dummy variables).13 The OLS and Oaxaca decomposition
results do not differ greatly, suggesting that differences in returns to observed characteristics are
not a major driver of the average wage differential. Using the similar data, Cai and Liu (2011)
also estimated the average public wage premium using OLS and Oaxaca decompositions. Their
estimates are lower than those in

12

The decompositions were estimated using the user-written Stata module –oaxaca–

(Jann, 2008)
13

Industry dummies are not included due to the heavy industrial segregation of public

sector employment.
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Table 8, and are in some cases negative. Much of this discrepancy is explained by
their inclusion of control variables for employer size.
The fixed effects and first difference (full controls) models use the same variables
and the same sample as the OLS model, with the following exceptions. Employees
with only a single observation are excluded from the fixed effects model.
Employees without consecutive observations are excluded from the first
difference model. Employees whose wage changed by more than one log point
were also excluded in each model. These results suggest that for both sexes,
some of the apparent public sector wage premium may be explained by higher
unobserved skills of public sector employees.14 However, these estimates are likely
to be subject to considerable attenuation bias due to reporting error in the sector
variable, as discussed above in the description of the data.
The next estimates are also generated using a first difference approach. Here, the
set of control variables is limited to those in the preferred model and education
changers are excluded. The results here are quite similar to the previous model,
suggesting that the larger set of controls makes little difference to the estimates,
thereby justifying their exclusion from our preferred model.
To examine the issue of attenuation bias, a third pair of first difference results is
estimated with the sample limited to job changers (the same sample as the
preferred model). For both sexes, the estimated wage premium is considerably
larger than the previous estimate, which conforms to the hypothesised
attenuation bias in the larger sample.
The first difference model estimated on the job changer sample is equivalent to
the preferred model with ψ restricted to equal 1. Since ψ is estimated to be close
to 1, so it is unsurprising that the estimated average wage premiums are similar in
the first difference models.

14

The fixed effects models were estimated using the user-written Stata module –xtivreg2–

(Schaffer, 2005)
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V CONCLUSION
We have used an adaptation of Lemieux’s (1993, 1998) quasi-differenced panel
data estimator to test whether the public sector wage premium varies with skill in
Australia. This estimator allows us to identify sectoral differences in returns to a
latent index of overall skill. We find no evidence to suggest that the public sector
wage premium varies with skill. This suggests that if low skill public sector workers
receive a wage premium, it is no larger than that of high skill workers. This is despite
the typical results of quantile regressions, which suggest that the premium is usually
much larger at the bottom of the wage distribution. How can these results be
reconciled? The quantile regression results could be explained by greater
variance in private sector wages for a given level of skill. Another explanation is
that the compressed wage profile of the public sector induces the best workers
(on unobserved skills) to join the public sector in low wage occupations, vice versa
in high wage occupations. This would be consistent with the recent work of
Bargain & Melly (2008) for France, who use a fixed effects quantile regression
approach. Whilst they are unable to account for differences in returns to
unobserved skills, they find that the apparent variation in the French public sector
wage premium across the wage distribution is mostly explained by sector selection
on unobserved skills. French public sector workers were found to have higher
unobserved skills at the bottom of the wage distribution, while the opposite is true
at the top of the distribution.
Our findings suggest that caution should be taken before inferring (from quantile
regression) that low skill public sector workers are considerably overpaid. If the
public sector does attract the best workers (on unobservables) in low skill
occupations, this is likely to translate to higher productivity. The finding also calls
into question the ability of governments to use wage setting policies to achieve
redistributive goals. If, for instance, governments aim to provide a wage premium
to public sector workers in low wage occupations, it may simply be inducing the
best workers (on unobserved characteristics) to join the public sector.
Our results are consistent with concerns over the ability of the public sector to
retain highly skilled workers. When compared to the results of Cai & Liu (2011), the
lack of a public sector wage penalty for high skill workers in our study suggests that
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the best workers (on unobserved characteristics) in high wage occupations select
into the private sector.
Further research is required to investigate these issues, since this literature has paid
insufficient attention to sectoral differences in unobserved skills (and in their
returns). In particular, the standard errors for ψ must be taken into account. The
95% confidence intervals do not rule out moderate sectoral differences in returns
to skills. It would thus be useful to conduct related studies using other data sources.
We also find that the average Australian public sector employee is paid slightly
more than he or she would be paid in the private sector. The preferred estimates
of this public sector wage premium are 4% for men and 6% for women, though the
estimate is not statistically significant for men. This does not include the value of
benefits such as superannuation and paid maternity leave which are also more
generous in the public sector. This positive average premium is consistent with
most of the international literature on this topic. It may result from the higher rates
of unionisation in the public sector. It is also possible that this ‘premium’
compensates public sector workers for unfavourable working environments.
However, the evidence for Australia suggests little or no sectoral difference in
levels of work-related stress or job satisfaction (Lewig and Dollard 2001; Macklin et
al. 2006).
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Table 1 Sample selection (number of observations)

Men Women Pooled
Job changers between any consecutive
with missing data

3116
149

3043
225

6159
374

outliers

103

88

191

changed education

161

210

371

2703

2520

5223

Final sample
Table 2 Sample means – job changers*

Men
Public Private Sector
Movers

Variable

ln wage
Experience (years)

Women
Public Private Sector
Movers

3.26
15.4

3.12
14.5

3.18
14.8

3.21
15.4

2.98
12.6

3.13
14.1

University degree

0.46

0.17

0.34

0.52

0.21

0.43

Trade

0.22

0.38

0.29

0.19

0.29

0.23

Year 12

0.16

0.21

0.18

0.16

0.26

0.19

less than Year 12

0.16

0.24

0.19

0.13

0.24

0.16

Casual

0.17

0.27

0.20

0.21

0.37

0.26

Shift / irregular

0.20

0.23

0.22

0.18

0.26

0.23

Managers

0.06

0.10

0.03

0.05

0.07

0.06

Professionals

0.39

0.15

0.32

0.48

0.17

0.38

Technicians and Trades Workers

0.13

0.25

0.19

0.02

0.05

0.02

Community and Personal Service

0.12

0.05

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

Clerical and Administrative Workers

0.15

0.08

0.13

0.27

0.29

0.28

Sales Workers

0.02

0.10

0.05

0.01

0.17

0.04

Machinery Operators and Drivers

0.04

0.13

0.05

0.00

0.01

0.01

Labourers And Related Workers

0.09

0.16

0.11

0.02

0.08

0.03

Tenure (years) with employer at t-1

3.50

2.74

3.62

3.19

2.41

2.87

Changed

0.53

0.48

0.57

0.41

0.46

0.46

300

2,403

294

479

2,041

461

Education

Occupation

Sample size

occupation

between

* The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the text. ‘Public’ denotes all
public sector employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Private’
denotes all private sector employees who changed employer since the previous observation.
‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who changed employer and sector since the
previous observation.
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Table 3 Sample means – all employees*

Variable
ln wage
Experience (years)

Men
Public Private Sector
Movers
3.37
3.12
3.18
23.1
17.5
14.8

Women
Public Private Sector
Movers
3.26
2.97
3.13
19.6
14.6
14.1

Education
University degree

0.42

0.18

0.34

0.50

0.20

0.43

Trade

0.34

0.36

0.29

0.23

0.26

0.23

Year 12

0.11

0.18

0.18

0.11

0.22

0.19

less than Year 12

0.13

0.27

0.19

0.16

0.32

0.16

Casual

0.08

0.22

0.20

0.14

0.35

0.26

Shift / irregular

0.24

0.26

0.22

0.22

0.27

0.23

Managers

0.11

0.13

0.03

0.06

0.07

0.06

Professionals

0.37

0.15

0.32

0.51

0.17

0.38

Technicians and Trades Workers

0.12

0.24

0.19

0.02

0.05

0.02

Community and Personal Service

0.14

0.05

0.12

0.17

0.15

0.18

Clerical and Administrative Workers

0.14

0.07

0.13

0.20

0.25

0.28

Sales Workers

0.01

0.09

0.05

0.01

0.19

0.04

Machinery Operators and Drivers

0.06

0.13

0.05

0.00

0.01

0.01

Labourers And Related Workers

0.06

0.15

0.11

0.03

0.10

0.03

Tenure (years) with employer at t-1

10.57

4.92

3.62

7.93

3.82

2.87

Sample size

5,714 21,419

294

7,987 19,120

461

Occupation

* ‘Public’ denotes all public sector employees. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector employees.
‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who changed employer and sector since the
previous observation.
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Table 4 Mean wages of public sector leavers and joiners

Males Females Pooled
mean ln wage
3.213
3.141
3.168
3.110
3.071
3.087
0.103
0.070
0.081
0.048
0.030
0.026
0.030
0.012
0.002

Leavers
Joiners
Difference
Standard error of difference
p-value of difference

Leavers
Joiners
Other job changers (not sector switchers)

mean change in ln
wage
-0.002
-0.009
-0.006
0.082
0.093
0.089
0.053
0.042
0.048

Leavers
Joiners
Other job changers (not sector switchers)

Number of observations
117
198
315
177
263
440
2,409
2,059
4,468

* The upper panel shows the mean log wage for public sector leavers and joiners, where for
each switcher, the log wage is averaged across one public sector observation and one
private sector observation (the observations immediately before and after the sector switch).
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Table 5 GMM estimates of wage equations*

Men
coefficient
Constant effect ( δ )
Returns to time invariant
skills in public sector (ψ)

Women

Pooled

SEcoefficient

SEcoefficient

SE

0.044

0.021

0.042

0.024

0.052

0.014

0.954

0.146

1.118

0.159

0.960

0.104

Casual

0.062

0.014

0.066

0.013

0.063

0.009

Shift Work

0.010

0.014

-0.017

0.015

-0.003

0.010

R
t
R
t −1

3.112

0.006

2.992

0.008

3.055

0.004

3.060

0.007

2.949

0.008

3.008

0.005

Returns to varying
characteristics

δ
δ

Hansen overidentification
statistic
(p-value)
Sample size

16.616

24.146

17.350

(0.277)

(0.044)

(0.238)

2703

2520

5223

* The dependent variable is the log wage. The sample is limited to that of the main analysis
as reported in the text. The Hansen overidentification test statistic follows a χ2 distribution with
14 degrees of freedom.

Table 6 Decomposition of Raw Average Wage Gap from GMM results

Men
Estimate

Women
SE Estimate

Pooled
SE Estimate

SE

Public Sector Wage Premium:
constant effect ( δ )
differences in returns to fixed
…characteristics

0.044 0.021

0.042 0.024

0.052 0.014

-0.005 0.015

0.017 0.022

-0.004 0.012

0.040 0.022

0.059 0.015

0.048 0.013

-0.006 0.002

-0.009 0.003

-0.007 0.001

0.110 0.022

0.176 0.016

0.132 0.013

Total effect of different
…characteristics

0.104 0.022

0.166 0.016

0.124 0.013

Unadjusted Wage Gap

0.144

0.225

0.172

Total average wage premium
Effect of differences in
characteristics:
casual and shiftwork status
fixed characteristics
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Table 7 Sensitivity Tests of Main Results

δ
Unrestricted returns to casual and shift
Men
0.034
Women
0.011
NLIV
Men
0.048
Women
0.039
ITGMM
Men
0.044
Women
0.044
Weighted
Men
0.020
Women
0.036
Waves 1 & 2
Men
0.118
Women
0.003
Waves 2 & 3
Men
0.011
Women
0.025
Waves 3 & 4
Men
0.050
Women
0.082
Waves 4 & 5
Men
0.036
Women
-0.011
Waves 5 & 6
Men
0.030
Women
0.062
Waves 6 & 7
Men
0.048
Women
0.027
Waves 7 & 8
Men
-0.108
Women
-0.008
Nonlinear Least Squares
Men
0.047
Women
0.059

Average
public
wage
SE premium

SE

ψ

0.026
0.034

1.021
1.262

0.172
0.212

0.047
0.062

0.022
0.015

0.020
0.021

0.954
1.174

0.135
0.153

0.043
0.063

0.022
0.016

0.021
0.023

0.954
1.106

0.145
0.157

0.040
0.059

0.022
0.015

0.024
0.027

0.974
1.190

0.163
0.200

0.018
0.060

0.023
0.018

0.041
0.059

0.601
1.815

0.172
0.375

0.035
0.108

0.064
0.027

0.079
0.064

1.771
1.582

0.587
0.411

0.084
0.105

0.045
0.033

0.050
0.038

0.877
0.874

0.194
0.192

0.044
0.065

0.057
0.037

0.039
0.067

1.415
1.059

0.244
0.332

0.045
-0.003

0.031
0.038

0.036
0.043

0.694
0.937

0.093
0.161

-0.042
0.050

0.070
0.042

0.046
0.038

1.104
0.778

0.199
0.227

0.053
-0.013

0.044
0.052

0.129
0.060

2.494
1.530

0.841
0.454

0.024
0.055

0.042
0.027

0.020
0.016

0.957
0.936

0.042
0.040

0.043
0.050

0.020
0.016
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SE

Table 8 Estimated Average Public Sector Wage Premium - Comparison to other Methods

Men

Women

Average
public
wage
premium

N

Average
public
wage
premium

SE

SE

N

OLS
Oaxaca decomposition

0.037
0.050

0.011
0.007

25,178
25,178

0.065
0.053

0.008
0.006

25,116
25,116

Fixed Effects

0.032

0.010

19,171

0.040

0.008

18,294

First Difference (full controls)

0.018

0.011

18,294

0.020

0.009

17,085

First
Difference
(limited
controls)
First
Difference (job changers
only)
(preferred
Quasi-Difference

0.024

0.012

17,736

0.022

0.009

16,849

0.046

0.020

2,703

0.054

0.007

2,520

0.040

0.022

2,703

0.059

0.015

2,520

model)
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Figure 1 Density of ln wage distribution amongst job changers*
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* The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the text. ‘Public’ denotes all
public sector employees who changed employer since the previous observation. ‘Private’
denotes all private sector employees who changed employer since the previous observation.
‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who changed employer and sector since the
previous observation.
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Figure 2 Density of ln wage distribution amongst all employees*
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* ‘Public’ denotes all public sector employees. ‘Private’ denotes all private sector employees.
‘Sector movers’ denotes all employees who changed employer and sector since the
previous observation.
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Figure 3 Density of ln wage distribution amongst public sector joiners and leavers*
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* The population is limited to sector switchers. For each switcher, the log wage is averaged
across one public sector observation and one private sector observation (the observations
immediately before and after the sector switch).
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